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Trial by  
Traditional Probability, 
Relative Plausibility,  
or Belief Function? 
Kevin M. Clermont† 
Abstract 
Almost incredible is that no one has ever formulated an adequate 
model for applying the standard of proof. What does the law call for? 
The usual formulation is that the factfinder must roughly test the 
finding on a scale of likelihood. So, the finding in a civil case must at 
least be more likely than not or, for the theoretically adventuresome, 
more than fifty percent probable. Yet everyone concedes that this form-
ulation captures neither how human factfinders actually work nor, more 
surprisingly, how theory tells us that factfinders should work. 
An emerging notion that the factfinder should compare the 
plaintiff’s story to the defendant’s story might be a step forward, but 
this relative plausibility conjecture has its problems. I contend instead 
that the mathematical theory of belief functions provides an alternative 
without those problems, and that the law in fact conforms to this 
theory. Under it, the standards of proof reveal themselves as instruc-
tions for the factfinder to compare the affirmative belief in the finding 
to any belief in its contradiction, but only after setting aside the range 
of belief that imperfect evidence leaves uncommitted. Accordingly, 
rather than requiring a civil case’s elements to exceed fifty percent or 
comparing best stories, belief functions focus on whether the perhaps 
smallish imprecise belief exceeds its smallish imprecise contradiction. 
Belief functions extend easily to the other standards of proof. Moreover, 
belief functions nicely clarify the workings of burdens of persuasion and 
production. 
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Introduction 
The different standards of proof determine outcome. Empirical 
proof supports that point, as long as the standard applied to the em-
pirical proof itself is not too demanding.1 In any event, standards are 
definitely worth worrying about. A firmer understanding would affect 
the resolution of many legal issues that arise in connections with 
standards and burdens of proof. Almost incredible, however, is that no 
one has yet formulated an adequate model of proof-standard applic-
ation. What does the law call for the factfinder to do? 
The standard of proof often finds expression in terms drawn from 
traditional probability theory.2 The formulation would be something 
along the lines that the factfinder must test whether the finding meets 
or exceeds the required standard on a scale of likelihood, albeit mer- 
ely a nonnumerical scale with coarse gradations such as: (1) slightest 
possibility, (2) reasonable possibility, (3) substantial possibility, (4) 
 
1. See Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Decision in Law: 
Psychological and Logical Bases for the Standard of Proof, 
Here and Abroad 103–16 (2013) (discussing empirical studies). I draw 
part of my argument from that book, which more fully documents the 
subject and broadens its reach considerably. In this Article, I try to 
marshal and synthesize specifically the arguments in favor of utilizing 
belief functions to produce a single and sound image for the standards and 
burdens of proof.  
2. See id. at 119–21 (explaining the traditional view of probability theories). 
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equipoise, (5) probability, (6) high probability, and (7) almost certain-
ty. Nonetheless, a yearning for more precision pushes many armchair 
theorists to use numbers in describing the scale. 
Take as a prime example the usual standard of proof in civil cases, 
which calls for a probability of more likely than not. “As every first-
year law student knows, the civil preponderance-of-the-evidence stand-
ard requires that a plaintiff establish the probability of her claim to 
greater than 0.5.”3 A moment’s reflection, however, reveals all sorts of 
problems with such a formulation of proof. First, there are the routine 
objections to speaking of proof in numerical terms. 4  Not only are 
percentages of likelihood not how people normally think about legal 
cases, but also use of numbers can mislead the factfinder.5 As soon as 
the theorist thinks more deeply about the nature of proof, those 
numbers produce all kinds of paradoxes.6 Second, the civil standard 
seems impossibly difficult: 
If the plaintiff must prove that some fact, X, is more probable 
than its negation, not-X, then the plaintiff should have to show 
not only the probability that the state of the world is such that 
X is true, but also the probability of every other possible state of 
the world in which X is not true. This would mean that in order 
to prevail, plaintiffs would have to disprove (or demonstrate the 
low likelihood of) each of the virtually limitless number of ways 
the world could have been at the relevant time. This would be a 
virtually impossible task, and thus, absent conclusive proof, plain-
tiffs would lose.7 
 
3. Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 Yale L.J. 
1254, 1256 (2013) (footnote omitted). 
4. See Clermont, supra note 1, at 75–78, 113–14 (providing potential 
problems from quantifying decisionmaking standards). 
5. Id. 
6. See Kevin M. Clermont, Aggregation of Probabilities and Illogic, 47 Ga. L. 
Rev. 165 (2012) (discussing logical problems surrounding aggregation of 
probabilities); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Conjunction of Evidence and 
Multivalent Logic, in Law and the New Logics (Lionel Smith ed., 
forthcoming 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2472383 
[http://perma.cc/A886-47PZ] (highlighting paradoxes in different standards 
of proof). The difficulties increase when one tries to account for multiple 
factfinders, as in a jury. See Richard H. Field, Benjamin Kaplan, Kevin 
M. Clermont & Catherine T. Struve, Materials for a Basic Course 
in Civil Procedure 1387–89 (11th ed. 2014) (resolving problems of 
which facts the jurors must agree on and of whether different jurors on a 
nonunanimous jury can provide support for different issues). 
7. Michael S. Pardo, Second-Order Proof Rules, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 1083, 1093 
(2009) (footnote omitted). 
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But in recognition of inevitably imperfect evidence, the law allows 
recovery upon much less than a fifty percent showing of probability.8 
Third, the civil standard simultaneously seems an impossibly easy one. 
The factfinder supposedly starts in a state of perfect ignorance, wherein 
the plaintiff’s claim has a fifty-fifty chance by the indifference principle. 
So, introduction of a feather’s weight of evidence should suffice for vic-
tory over a silent defendant. But we all know that in such a case, the 
plaintiff would lose by directed verdict. A feather’s weight might swing 
the burden of persuasion, but it does not satisfy the burden of prod-
uction. The reality is that the law requires much stronger evidence.9 
Consequently, it is abundantly clear that academics need to “let go 
of their love for p > 0.5.”10 Among the various proffered alternatives,11 
the most frequently ballyhooed way to let go of the love is the relative 
plausibility theory.12 It builds on psychology’s story model of holistic 
 
8. See Larry Laudan, Strange Bedfellows: Inference to the Best Explanation and 
the Criminal Standard of Proof, 11 Int’l J. Evidence & Proof 292, 304–05 
(2007) (“The trier of fact cannot say, ‘Although plaintiff’s case is stronger than 
defendant’s, I will reach no verdict since neither party has a frightfully good 
story to tell’. Under current rules, if the plaintiff has a better story than the 
defendant, he must win the suit, even when his theory of the case fails to satisfy 
the strictures required to qualify his theory as the best explanation.”). 
9. See 2 McCormick on Evidence § 338, at 654 (7th ed. 2013) (“A 
‘scintilla’ of evidence will not suffice.”). 
10. Cheng, supra note 3, at 1258. 
11. E.g., Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law 133–40 (2005) 
(arguing for viewing standards of proof in terms of allocation of risk); 
Christoph Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence Versus Intime Conviction: 
A Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict Between American and Continental 
European Law, 33 Vt. L. Rev. 435 (2009) (arguing for a standard based 
on psychological confidence); Leonard R. Jaffee, Of Probativity and 
Probability: Statistics, Scientific Evidence, and the Calculus of Chance  
at Trial, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 925 (1985) (rejecting use of probability 
and arguing that the burdened party must establish truth); Luke Meier, 
Probability, Confidence, and the “Reasonable Jury” Standard, 84 Miss. 
L.J. 747 (2015) (arguing for a standard based on statistical confidence); 
Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the 
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357 (1985) (arguing that the 
process of proof aims at generating acceptable statements about past events 
and thus at projecting behavioral norms to the public). 
12. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion in Civil 
Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 Mich. St. L. Rev. 893, 929–43 
(explaining the origin of the relative plausibility theory). The weight of the 
evidence methodology in science is a similar approach, as is the differential 
diagnosis approach in medicine that diagnoses by successively eliminating 
plausible causes of a medical condition to reveal the best explanation. See 
Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(admitting expert evidence based on the weight of the evidence approach: “The 
scientist must (1) identify an association between an exposure and a disease, 
(2) consider a range of plausible explanations for the association, (3) rank the 
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evidence-processing.13 The relative plausibility theory posits that the 
factfinder constructs the overall story (or stories, in some variants of 
the theory) that the plaintiff is spinning and another story (or stories) 
that the defendant is (or could be) spinning.14 The factfinder then com-
pares the two stories (or collections of stories) and gives victory to the 
plaintiff if the plaintiff’s version is more plausible than the defendant’s.15  
rival explanations according to their plausibility, (4) seek additional evidence 
to separate the more plausible from the less plausible explanations, (5) consider 
all of the relevant available evidence, and (6) integrate the evidence using 
professional judgment to come to a conclusion about the best explanation.”); 
Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262–63 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(admitting expert evidence based on differential diagnosis). These methods 
involve consideration and analysis of alternative explanations to get the one 
that best explains the evidence, a mode of reasoning called inference to the 
best explanation. Professor Allen is drifting in his thinking in this direction. See 
Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 
55 Ariz. L. Rev. 557, 567–70 (2013) (discussing adjudicative factfinding as 
inference to the best explanation); Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, 
Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 Law & Phil. 223 (2008) 
(discussing how inference to the best explanation explains judicial proof). 
However, Laudan, supra note 8, powerfully demonstrates that inference to the 
best explanation holds little additional promise of explaining or illuminating 
standards of proof. But cf. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Probability, 
Explanation and Interference: A Reply, 11 Int’l J. Evidence & Proof 307, 
314–17 (2007) (defending their best explanation approach in a way that pares 
it back into a form consistent with a relative plausibility approach). 
13. See generally Jeffrey T. Frederick, The Psychology of the American 
Jury 296-99 (1987) (providing a brief overview of the story model of evidence-
processing); Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, The Psychology of Juror and 
Jury Decision Making, in Reid Hastie, Steven D. Penrod & Nancy 
Pennington, Inside the Jury 22–23 (1983) (providing a brief summary of 
empirical studies supporting the story model); Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. 
Hans, Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman, The Timing of Opinion 
Formation by Jurors in Civil Cases: An Empirical Examination, 67 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 627, 629–33 (2000) (discussing three predominant models of jury 
decisionmaking); Reid Hastie, What’s the Story? Explanations and Narratives 
in Civil Jury Decisions, in Civil Juries and Civil Justice 23, 31–32 (Brian 
H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008) (expanding the theory to allow for a party’s 
multiple stories); Jill E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo, Sexual Harassment Stories: 
Testing a Story-Mediated Model of Juror Decision-Making in Civil Litigation, 
27 Law & Hum. Behav. 29, 29 (2003) (presenting research that “extends the 
story model to civil litigation and tests a story-mediated model against an 
unmediated model of jury decision-making”); Nancy Pennington & Reid 
Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in Inside the Juror: 
The Psychology of Juror Decision Making 192 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) 
(detailing the story model and summarizing empirical studies testing it); cf. 
Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal 
Decision Making, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 511, 559–69 (2004) (arguing that 
factfinders consider evidence holistically rather than atomistically). 
14. Allen & Jehl, supra note 12, at 937–38. 
15. Id. 
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This choice between alternative competing narratives is largely an 
ordinal process rather than a cardinal one.16 Relative plausibility has 
advantages besides drawing on the currently prevailing psychological 
literature. It shows a nontraditional embrace of relative judgment by 
the factfinder, in preference to humans’ weaker skills at absolute judg-
ment of likelihood.17 Also, by inventing a test to apply only at the end 
of a trial, it sidesteps many of the difficulties and paradoxes of using a 
numerical standard like greater than fifty percent.18 
Yet, even as most of its proponents admit, relative plausibility 
theory has its own problems.19 First, an ordinal comparison cannot 
easily explain standards of proof higher or lower than preponderance of 
the evidence.20 Standards from a reasonable suspicion up to evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt are hard to express as a comparison of 
stories.21 Second, a more obvious difficulty is that it does not track well 
what the law tells its factfinders about how to proceed.22 The law says 
 
16. Id. 
17. Relative judgment concerns the considerable capacity of people to 
distinguish between two or more different stimuli that they can compare 
directly. Although not entirely distinct, absolute judgment instead involves 
reference to a remembered scale. See William N. Dember & Joel S. 
Warm, Psychology of Perception 113, 116–17 (2d ed. 1979) (explaining 
the difference between absolute and relative judgment). 
18. See Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the 
Law of Evidence, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1491, 1542–46 (2001) (discussing prob-
abilistic evidence). 
19. See Richard D. Friedman, “E” Is for Eclectic: Multiple Perspectives on 
Evidence, 87 Va. L. Rev. 2029, 2046–47 (2001) (noting problems with 
relative plausibility theory). 
20. See Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 
373, 413 (1991) (attempting to explain the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard as not being satisfied if the factfinder “concludes that there is a 
plausible scenario consistent with innocence,” while admitting that the clear-
and-convincing standard is “troublesome” under his theory because it seems 
cardinal); Allen & Leiter, supra note 18, at 1528 (saying that the prosecution 
must “show that there is no plausible account of innocence”); Michael S. 
Pardo, Group Agency and Legal Proof; or, Why the Jury Is an “It,” 56 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 1793, 1829 (2015) (attempting to explain the clear-and-
convincing standard as requiring that “the plaintiff’s explanation must be 
clearly and convincingly better that the defendant’s explanation”). 
21. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 2046–47 (discussing relative plausibility 
theory and standards of decision). 
22. See Ronald J. Allen, Standards of Proof and the Limits of Legal Analysis 14 
(Northwestern University School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, May 3, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830344 
[http://perma.cc/AAR6-5X5W] (noting the inconsistencies between jury 
instructions and relative plausibility); Pardo, supra note 7, at 1093 (discussing 
ambiguities in the language of the standard for preponderance of evidence). 
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to proceed element-by-element and apply the standard of proof to each 
element, not to create holistic stories and compare them.23 Third, it 
diverges from the law by compelling the nonburdened party, or at least 
imposing a practical obligation, to choose and formulate a competing 
version of the truth.24 The law allows the defendant to stand mute and 
still prevail.25 Fourth, comparing the plaintiff’s story only to the defen-
dant’s favorite story, rather than to all versions of nonliability, will 
result in recovery by plaintiffs more often than normatively desirable.26 
The plaintiff should lose if liability is less likely than nonliability, re-
gardless of which story the defendant prefers.27 Fifth, the theory comes 
 
23. See 3 Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E. Grenig & William C. Lee, Federal 
Jury Practice and Instructions: Civil § 104.01 (6th ed. 2011) (“Plaintiff 
has the burden in a civil action, such as this, to prove every essential element 
of plaintiff’s claim by a preponderance of the evidence. If plaintiff should fail 
to establish any essential element of plaintiff’s claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence, you should find for defendant as to that claim.”). 
24. Cheng, supra note 3, at 1262 n.15. 
25. See 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra note 9, § 339, at 660–61 (explaining 
that because juries bring their own experiences, it is possible for a verdict 
to find for a defendant who offers nothing in opposition to the plaintiff’s 
evidence).  
26. Realization of this difficulty leads some theorists to argue that the aim of the 
trial system is not truth and minimizing error costs but, say, acceptability of 
decision. See Nesson, supra note 11, at 1390 (describing how the legal system 
strives to find the most likely of all stories). In fact, those theorists have a 
better argument for looking only at the defendant’s best story than they 
realize. If they were to extend relative plausibility’s “ordered partition” theory 
into a more sophisticated “ranking theory,” then they could show that the 
looking at defendant’s best story allows ignoring all other defendant stories. 
But accepting ranking theory works out to be the equivalent of accepting 
belief functions. See Franz Huber, Belief and Degrees of Belief, in Degrees 
of Belief 1, 16–20 (Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri eds., 2009) 
(comparing belief theory and ranking theory). 
27. See David Hamer, Probabilistic Standards of Proof, Their Complements 
and the Errors That Are Expected to Flow from Them, 1 U. New Eng. L.J. 
71 (2004) (discussing probability theory); D.H. Kaye, The Error of Equal 
Error Rates, 1 Law, Probability & Risk 3, 7 (2002) (arguing that the 
p > 0.5 rule is appealing because “it minimizes expected losses”); Mark 
Schweizer, Loss Aversion, Omission Bias and the Civil Standard of Proof, 
in European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics 
125, 128–32 (Klaus Mathis ed., 2015) (describing the decision theoretic 
framework); cf. Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating 
the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1159, 
1168–71 (1983) (considering bias in the distribution of errors). 
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with baggage.28 It requires, for example, acceptance of some holistic 
account of factfinding like the story model.29 
There must be a better, and perhaps simpler, way to conceive the 
standard of proof. The mathematical theory of belief functions provides 
an alternative superior to traditional probability theory and to the new-
er approach of relative plausibility. Part I will explain belief functions 
and how they can help understand the idea of a standard of proof 
applied to a single element of a case. Part II uses the theory to explain 
both the burden of persuasion and its associated array of standards of 
proof. Part III then uses the theory to explain both the burden of 
production and its role in safeguarding certain process and outcome 
values. Part IV steps back from the theory to see how it will work in 
the real world, including how belief functions work when applied to the 
multiple elements of a case. 
I. Proof by Factfinders’ Beliefs 
The first step on the journey is to realize that the key assumption 
of classical logic makes every proposition absolutely either true or false, 
an assumption called the principle of bivalence.30 Multivalent logic 
instead allows propositions to be both true and false to a degree, so 
they can take on middle values of truth.31 Consequently, classical logic 
has no tools for handling partial truths, propositions that will forever 
be uncertainly stuck partway between false and true. Traditional prob-
ability theory, a mathematical supplement to classical logic, treats only 
the random odds of a proposition turning out to be either false or true. 
Contrariwise, multivalent logic developed to handle partial truths. 
Fuzzy logic is one example of multivalent logic.32 Deciding how to pro-
ceed in a world of persisting uncertainty (including how to combine 
partial truths) logically differs from predicting how uncertainty will 
resolve itself into certainty (including how to calculate the odds of mult-
iple events occurring together). 
 
28. See Craig R. Callen, Commentary, Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson: A 
Comment on Professor Allen’s Theory, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 423, 432–
39 (1991) (discussing some problems with the relative plausibility theory). 
29. See id. at 435–39 (explaining the story model). 
30. See Theodore Sider, Logic for Philosophy 73 (2010) (stating that 
classic logic is “bivalent,” with exactly two truth values). 
31. See generally J.C. Beall & Bas C. van Fraassen, Possibilities and 
Paradox: An Introduction to Modal and Many-Valued Logic (2003) 
(providing an overview of multivalent logic). 
32. Id. 
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Even in the absence of that fundamental realization, a common way 
for factfinders to express their assessment of evidence33 is as a gradation 
of belief in a proposition, where the gradation may take any numerical 
(or usually nonnumerical) value throughout the whole interval from 
zero to one. There is nothing controversial about such a formulation, 
which is compatible with the bivalently based approaches of traditional 
probability or relative plausibility. 
Factfinders could, however, use multivalent “degrees of belief.” 
These turn out to be an especially useful way to express likelihood 
because they can capture all the various kinds of uncertainty in the 
world. The world exhibits several kinds of uncertainty, including the 
uncertainty characterized as the vagueness of matters of degree and 
also the indeterminacy resulting from scarce information or conflicting 
evidence. By following multivalent logic’s rejection of the assumption 
that all things are either completely true or completely false, degrees of 
belief can employ the middle values of truth to pick up the extra infor-
mation about all these uncertainties.34 
By contrast, the probability calculus breaks down when the assum-
ption of bivalence no longer holds, as it does in the task of factfinding. 
The process of proof investigates a world that is not a two-valued world 
where disputed facts are either true or false. Instead, a good portion, 
but not all, of the real world is a vague, imprecise, or many-valued 
world, where fuzzy partial truths exist. Or, the factfinders might never 
be able to learn whether a disputed fact is certainly true or false, so 
that any absolute truth remains inaccessible to their minds. Therefore, 
 
33. My interest in this Article is not so much the factfinders’ initial processing of 
evidence, but rather the subsequent steps that involve their application of a 
standard of proof to the assessment of the evidence. Application of a standard 
of proof is a step largely separable from evidential argument. See Clermont, 
supra note 1, at 123–29 (detailing the difference between applying a standard 
of proof and assessing evidence). Although psychologists can tell us something 
about how humans process evidence, they have contributed almost nothing on 
how humans would apply standards of proof, leaving the dispute to logicians 
so far. Fortunately, my discussion of the standard of proof is compatible with 
any method used initially to process pieces of evidence that reinforce or 
undermine each other. For example, it would accept factfinders’ using intuitive 
techniques in a nonquantitative and approximate fashion to evaluate and 
combine evidence on a factual element, as they pursue the abductive task of 
seeking truth while they interlace inductive premises and perform deductive 
testing of interim conclusions. Compare Edmund M. Morgan, Introduction to 
Evidence, in Austin W. Scott & Sidney P. Simpson, Cases and Other 
Materials on Civil Procedure 941, 943–45 (1950) (discussing the logical 
methods jurors use to process evidence), with Mark Spottswood, The Hidden 
Structure of Fact-Finding, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 131 (2013) (applying 
the dual-process psychological framework to legal factfinding). 
34. Glenn Shafer, A Mathematical Theory of Evidence (1976). 
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humans can accurately represent certain things in the world, such as 
historical fact, only as partial truths or degrees of belief. 
If one embraces this approach, the general problem becomes how 
to handle a degree of belief about the real world that will persist 
unavoidably in factfinding. First, by “degree of belief” I do not mean 
the odds of something being eventually revealed to be an absolute truth, 
but rather I mean a belief that expresses a fuzzy degree of certainty 
about the state of the world as represented by the available evidence 
and that lies somewhere between holding the thing completely false and 
holding it completely true. Beliefs represent neither firm knowledge nor 
some squishy personal feeling or strictly internal whim. A belief is an 
attempt rationally to evaluate the evidence in the pursuit of truth.35 
Second, the “real world” is the world as perceived by humans and 
described by natural language.36 Third, I refer to “factfinding” in its 
broad sense, as covering anything that a court or other entity subjects 
to a proof process in order to establish what the entity will treat as 
truth. It would include application of law to fact, as well as pure fact. 
This Part will introduce the theory of belief functions, showing it 
to work well in representing how imperfect evidence keeps factfinders 
from committing all of their belief. Then, this Part will introduce the 
idea of comparing belief and disbelief of a fact, which the factfinder 
would do only after putting any uncommitted belief aside. 
A. Belief Functions 
I can pick up the theoretical developments with emergence of the 
field of imprecise probability.37 This modern field of mathematics pro-
vides a useful extension of probability theory whenever information is 
scarce or conflicting. The basic idea is to use interval specifications of 
 
35. See Glenn Shafer, The Construction of Probability Arguments, 66 B.U. L. 
Rev. 799, 801–04 (1986) (contrasting three other interpretations of 
probability); cf. David Enoch, Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher, Statistical 
Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge, 40 Phil. & Pub. 
Affairs 197, 211–15 (2012) (arguing that law’s primary interest is accurate 
determination of truth, not knowledge); Pardo, supra note 20, at 1810–16 
(linking “justified true belief” to knowledge). But cf. David Christensen, 
Putting Logic in Its Place 12–13, 69 (2004) (saying that for certain 
purposes some theorists use “belief” as an unqualified assertion of an all-or-
nothing state of belief); L. Jonathan Cohen, Should a Jury Say What It 
Believes or What It Accepts?, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 465 (1991) (using 
“belief,” for his purposes, in the sense of a passive feeling). 
36. See D. Michael Risinger, Searching for Truth in the American Law of 
Evidence and Proof, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 801 (2013) (treating the necessary 
philosophical assumptions). 
37. See generally Peter Walley, Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise 
Probabilities (1991) (detailing imprecise probabilities). 
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probability, with a lower and an upper probability.38 The rules asso-
ciated with traditional probability, except those based on assuming an 
excluded middle, carry over to imprecise probability. Despite its name, 
imprecise probability theory is more complete and accurate than precise 
probability in the real world where uncertainty prevails. Imprecise 
probability can work with multivalent logic as well as with classical 
logic. In fact, traditional probability built on bivalence appears as a 
special case in this theory.39 
Belief function theory is a further step toward set theory.40 To put 
its multivalent degrees of belief in set theory’s terms, the gradation of 
belief expresses the assessment in terms of the proposition’s imprecise 
and indeterminate degree of membership in the set of true facts. Belief 
function theory does not constitute a system of logic, unlike multivalent 
logic. Instead, it remains a branch of mathematics. It indeed rests on a 
highly rigorous mathematical base, managing to get quite close to 
achieving a unified theory of uncertainty.41 Just as traditional prob-
ability serves bivalent logic by mathematically handling a kind of un-
certainty for which the underlying logic system does not otherwise 
account,42 belief function theory delivers mathematical notions that can 
extend a logical system. Simple fuzzy logic can pick up the vagueness 
of the world. Belief function notions can supplement that logic by cap-
turing and expressing in an easy and comprehensible way the indeter-
minacy resulting from scarce or conflicting evidence concerning fact.43  
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. See generally Shafer, supra note 34 (describing belief function theory); Glenn 
Shafer, Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Belief Functions, 4 Int’l 
J. Approximate Reasoning 323 (1990) (discussing the implementation of 
the theory of belief functions). For an accessible introduction, see David A. 
Schum, The Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning 222–
43 (1994) (showing the current applications of belief functions). For a fuller 
historical account, see Rolf Haenni, Non-Additive Degrees of Belief, in 
Degrees of Belief 121, 127–33 (Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri 
eds., 2009) (detailing the history of the theory). 
41. See Didier Dubois & Henri Prade, A Unified View of Uncertainty Theories 
(Mar. 7, 2012) (unpublished manuscript). 
42. See Irving M. Copi, Carl Cohen & Kenneth McMahon, Introduction 
to Logic ch. 14 (14th ed. 2011). 
43. I have previously surveyed the various theories on how to handle uncertainty, 
and explored the ones that best image how the law contemplates uncertainty. 
For the purposes of expressing imprecise evidential assessments in probability-
like terms and conjoining separate findings, fuzzy logic is the optimal theory. 
See supra note 6 (describing and justifying fuzzy logic). For the purposes of 
understanding how to apply the standards of proof, the compatible theory of 
belief functions is more expressive. See Clermont, supra note 1, at 201–20 
(explaining, and preferring, belief functions as a way to account for imperfect 
legal evidence and to apply the standards of proof); cf. id. at 162–63 (discussing 
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The key distinction between degrees of belief and probabilities is 
subtle, as attested by the confusion among people discussing proof over 
the long years. Both systems numerically quantify uncertainty by using 
measurements in the unit interval [0,1]. But the distinction’s conse-
quences are not subtle. Degrees of belief accommodate vagueness better 
than traditional probability theory, and they better capture the effect 
of imperfect evidence. The measure of the factfinder’s complexly con-
structed belief in the real world is more relevant than the probability 
of truth in an imagined world of merely random uncertainty. Finally, 
belief functions give the tools for translating beliefs about facts into 
decisions. 
1. Basics of Theory  
Given that factfinders should not ask how probable is proposition 
S but rather what is their degree of belief in S as a true proposition (or 
the degree of S’s truth, which is a degree of membership in the set of 
true facts), I propose considering a broad version of belief functions as 
a legal model for human expression of likelihood.44 It will give us a 
handle on how to employ and manipulate such beliefs.45 
The broad version of the theory of belief functions will also provide 
us with a good mental image for representing indeterminacy.46 On the 
basis of incomplete, inconclusive, ambiguous, dissonant, or untrustwor-
thy evidence, some of the factfinders’ belief should remain indeter-
minate. In factfinding, we ask how much we believe S to be a real-world 
truth based on the evidence, as well as how much we believe notS—
while remaining conscious of indeterminacy and so recognizing that part 
of our belief will remain uncommitted. 
Beliefs can range anywhere between zero and one. If the belief in S 
is called Bel(S), then 0  Bel(S)  1. Likewise, belief in notS, which is 
disbelief of S or belief in S’s contradiction, falls between zero and one.  
so-called ultrafuzzy sets as a way to handle imperfect evidence, but acknow-
ledging that the logical operators for ultrafuzzy sets become complicated), 
202–03 (describing possibility theory as a way to exploit the compatibility of 
fuzzy logic and belief functions). 
44. Cf. Vilém Novák, Modeling with Words, Scholarpedia (2008), 
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Modeling_with_words [http://perma. 
cc/2JWT-YLZ8] (“Mathematical fuzzy logic has two branches: fuzzy logic in 
narrow sense (FLn) and fuzzy logic in broader sense (FLb). FLn is a formal 
fuzzy logic which is a special many-valued logic generalizing classical 
mathematical logic . . . . FLb is an extension of FLn which aims at 
developing a formal theory of human reasoning.”). 
45. See Shafer, supra note 34, at 35–37 (discussing belief functions). 
46. See Liping Liu & Ronald R. Yager, Classic Works of the Dempster-Shafer 
Theory of Belief Functions: An Introduction, in Classic Works of the 
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions 1, 2–19 (Ronald R. 
Yager & Liping Liu eds., 2008) (formalizing an image of belief functions). 
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Under the scheme of belief functions, we are squarely in the realm of 
nonadditive measures.47 In other words, a belief and a belief in its con-
tradiction will normally add to less than one. The zone between Bel(S) 
and Bel(notS) represents the uncommitted belief. 
Factfinders form their beliefs and disbeliefs based on the available 
evidence. Jurors might believe a fact more than they disbelieve it, even 
if they would not be willing to bet on it as more likely than not if the 
truth could somehow be revealed. The belief might be quite weak as it 
rests only on what evidence is available. Contrariwise, a bet must co-
mmit total belief to either yes or no, and betting odds always add to 
one. Thus, a historian of the French Revolution might believe that 
Robespierre did such-and-such on a given day, but not be willing to bet 
on the act versus all other possibilities. The historian would also go on 
to construct a believed narrative of the Reign of Terror without ever 
treating his or her beliefs as betting odds, for example, by multiplying 
them to get conjoined facts. This fundamental difference between non-
additive beliefs and betting odds is subtle but essential, as all else follows 
from it. 
Consider belief function theory’s treatment of a single factual 
hypothesis. Take as an example the issue of whether Tom was the perp-
etrator of a crime. Although you have no definitive evidence, three 
witnesses say he was. One seems somewhat credible. But you think that 
another saw at the scene a different man at a different time, which 
discounts this evidence of guilt but gives no support to his being inn-
ocent. And you think that the third might be lying as part of a cover-
up of some other person’s guilt, an interpretation that is compatible 
with both guilt and innocence and so gives some thin support  
to Tom’s not being involved. In sum, this body of evidence supports 
your .5 belief that Tom was the perpetrator, or Bel(Tom). The evidence 
also supports your weaker belief that Tom was not involved, with 
Bel(notTom) coming in at .2. That is, Bel(notTom) is not determined 
by the value of Bel(Tom). The remaining .3 is indeterminate, meaning 
he could be either the perpetrator or not. The evidence is imperfect. 
The defects in evidence might be probative, affecting Bel(Tom) or 
Bel(notTom); but the defects might be nonprobative, so that they just 
leave some belief uncommitted. (This example actually involves a  
so-called power set of four beliefs: Tom, notTom, neither Tom nor 
notTom, and either Tom or notTom. The belief in the “null” of Tom’s 
being neither perpetrator nor uninvolved is set by definition to be zero. 
The belief in the “catchall” of Tom’s being either perpetrator or unin-
volved is one.) 
 
 
47. See generally Haenni, supra note 40, at 121–27 (describing nonadditive 
degrees of belief); Ron A. Shapira, Economic Analysis of the Law of Evidence: 
A Caveat, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1607, 1613–16 (1998) (distinguishing additive 
from nonadditive). 
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Again, Bel(Tom) is the extent to which you believe Tom to be the 
perpetrator. That belief is sometimes called the lower probability. The 
upper probability bound represents “possibility.”48 It is the extent to 
which you think his being the perpetrator is possible, that is, the sum 
of the affirmative belief plus the indeterminate belief. The indeter-
minate zone between a belief expressed as Bel(Tom) and the belief in 
its contradiction expressed as Bel(notTom) represents uncommitted 
belief owing to imperfect evidence. The possibility that he is the perpe-
trator is .8, being .5 + .3. The possibility that he was not the perpe-
trator totals .5, being .2 + .3. Possibility equals one minus the belief in 
the contradiction. (A traditionally expressed probability of his being 
the perpetrator would fall within the range from the lower to the upper 
probability.49) 
The resultant beliefs can be expressed, if expression is ever 
necessary, as coarsely gradated beliefs. In addition to the benefits of 
utilizing natural language, these terms convey the uncertainty in deter-
mining the belief. Thus, in lieu of expressing beliefs in terms of decimals, 
one should use the coarse gradations of (1) slightest possibility, (2) 
reasonable possibility, (3) substantial possibility, (4) equipoise, (5) 
probability, (6) high probability, and (7) almost certainty. The coarse-
ness of this scale of likelihood also means that the factfinder in compar-
ing beliefs will not have to draw paper-thin distinctions. 
In the end, the representation of findings in the form of nonnumer-
ical beliefs best captures the effect of imperfect evidence, which was a 
 
48. See Jeffrey A. Barnett, Computational Methods for A Mathematical Theory 
of Evidence, in Classic Works of the Dempster-Shafer Theory of 
Belief Functions 197, 200–01 (Ronald R. Yager & Liping Liu eds., 2008) 
(providing a neat mental image for these bounds); A.P. Dempster, Upper 
and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalued Mapping, 38 Annals 
Mathematical Stat. 325 (1967) (providing the mathematical proof for 
upper and lower probabilities); L.A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets as a Basis for a 
Theory of Possibility, 1 Fuzzy Sets & Sys. 3 (1978) (relating the theory 
of fuzzy sets to the theory of possibility). In belief function terminology, 
“possibility” is often phrased as “plausibility.” See Schum, supra note 40, 
at 236 (using the phrase “plausibility” in place of “possibility”). 
49. See Haenni, supra note 40, at 129 (discussing betting probability); cf. 
Glenn Shafer, Belief Functions, in Readings in Uncertain Reasoning 
473, 475–76 (Glenn Shafer & Judea Pearl eds., 1990) (describing this 
probability in more complicated settings). 
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rallying cry of Baconian theorists.50 The move from probability to belief 
is also a slight nod to the civil-law emphasis on inner belief as captured 
by its intime conviction standard,51 and to the frequent cris de coeur of 
theorists who lament any intrusion of probabilistic mathematics into 
the very human process of proof.52 
2. Negation Operator 
By traditional probability theory, the probability of a proposition’s 
negation (or contradiction) equals 1 minus the probability of the prop-
osition. If Tom is sixty percent likely the perpetrator, he is forty percent 
likely uninvolved. 
However, Bel(Tom) and Bel(notTom) do not necessarily add to 1, 
because normally some belief remains uncommitted. Thus, for Tom, 
Bel(Tom)=.5 and Bel(notTom)=.2, so the sum of determinate beliefs 
adds to .7. 
The complement of Bel(Tom) equals (1 − Bel(Tom)), but this gives 
the possibility of notTom, not the belief in notTom. Indeed, the possi-
bility of notTom equals (Bel(notTom) + uncommitted belief). Hence, 
there is a big difference between the complement and the belief in the 
 
50. See L. Jonathan Cohen, The Probable and the Provable 49–57, 245–
64 (1977) (developing, as an alternative to Pascalian (or mathematicist) 
probability, a Baconian (or inductive) theory of probability). Baconian theory 
tries to look not only at the evidence presented, but also at the evidence not 
available. It makes evidential completeness a key criterion, and thereby 
stresses an important concern. Cf. Hans Rott, Degrees All the Way Down: 
Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs, in Degrees of Belief 301, 306 (Franz 
Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri eds., 2009) (seeing Baconian probability as 
a variation on belief functions). 
51. See Clermont, supra note 1, at 221-72 (discussing the divergence 
between common-law and civil-law countries’ standards of proof). With 
their emphasis on “conviction” in the intime conviction standard, the 
civil-law countries signal their devotion to belief, albeit a belief seemingly 
built upon a binary worldview (and perhaps a belief compared to an absolute 
threshold inherited from the criminal model). Such an approach fit better 
with an inquisitorial model than it did with an adversarial model, allowing 
it to persist for centuries. But its survival until today may rest instead on 
the civil-law system’s desire to enhance the appearance of legitimacy. 
52. See, e.g., Jaffee, supra note 11, at 934–51 (1985) (attacking the use of 
probability in analyzing proof); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: 
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1971) 
(writing the classic version of the lament, in which Professor Tribe stressed 
not only the risk of misuse of mathematical techniques, including inaccurate 
meshing of numerical proof with soft or unquantifiable variables, but also 
the undercutting of society’s values, including the dehumanization of the 
legal process); Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. 
Rev. 487, 508 (1986) (arguing that probabilistic assessment diminishes “the 
hope of seeing justice supervene in individual trials,” while seeing factfinding 
as an individualized but value-laden process). 
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negation, the difference being the uncommitted belief. Belief function 
theory thus utilizes the very useful distinction between a disbelief and 
a lack of belief. After all, disbelief and lack of belief are entirely different 
states of mind. 
In sum, a belief in S normally does not imply anything about the 
belief in notS, other than that the contradiction cannot be more likely 
than the complement. Given scarce information or conflicting evidence, 
one forms a belief in a proposition, while leaving a lot of belief uncomm-
itted and without necessarily forming any belief in the proposition’s 
contradiction. One would need proof or inference of the contradiction 
before generating any belief in it. 
3. Lack of Proof 
Traditional probability encounters legendary difficulties with a 
state of ignorance.53 The reason is that it cannot distinguish between 
belief, lack of belief, and disbelief. Assume that the factfinder dutifully 
starts by setting the belief in S at zero. In classical terms, S=0 means 
that S is impossible. And it means that notS is certain. No amount of 
evidence could alter an impossibility or a certainty into a possibility 
under Bayes’ theorem.54 As a way out, probabilists sometimes assert 
that the ignorant inquirer should start in the middle where the prob-
abilities of true and false under the applicable standard of proof are 
both fifty percent. But this trick does not accord with the actual prob-
abilities or with the law’s instructions. That is, the supposition of fifty 
percent, on the thought that the fact is either true or false, comports 
neither with reality nor with where the law tells the factfinder to begin, 
and it produces inconsistencies when there are more than two hypo-
theses in play.55 
Meanwhile, one of the great strengths of belief function theory is 
that it can well represent a state of ignorance.56 An inquirer, if ignorant 
and well behaved, starts at zero, not at a fifty-percent belief. When 
Bel(S)=0, it does not mean that S is so highly unlikely as to be im-
possible. It means there is no evidence in support. Accordingly, the 
 
53. See Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the 
Process of Proof, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 439, 462–67 (1986) (noting that employing 
1:1 as the appropriate odds for someone who is ignorant of the true facts 
can cause many problems). 
54. See Lea Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66 B.U. 
L. Rev. 673, 686–88 (1986) (considering second-order evidence that 
cannot be accommodated by the Bayesian framework). 
55. See State v. Spann, 617 A.2d 247, 254 (N.J. 1993) (“.5 assumed prior 
probability clearly is neither neutral nor objective”); Jaffee, supra note 
11, at 980–85 (discussing the “incompatibility of proper belief-formation 
and ‘subjective probability’ statistics”). 
56. See Shafer, supra note 34, at 22–24 (referring to belief function as “represent-
ation of ignorance”). 
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inquirer starts out with everything indeterminate, because the lack of 
evidence makes one withhold all of one’s belief. Although Bel(S)=0, 
Bel(notS) equals zero too. The uncommitted belief is the entirety or 1, 
meaning that S is completely possible, as is notS. In other words, the 
inquirer does not believe or disbelieve S. Belief function theory thus 
utilizes the very useful notion of lack of belief. 
B. Comparison of Beliefs 
My conceptualization has thus far led me to think that the law 
should not and does not employ the prevailing academic view of the 
proof process resting on a bivalent logical approach. Factfinders instead 
determine their beliefs as degrees of real-world truth based on the 
evidence, just as the law expects of them. Eventually they end up with 
Bel(S) and Bel(notS), falling between zero and one, but not normally 
adding to one. What then do they do? 
So, finally, I come to the matter of applying a standard of decision. 
The law dictates that factfinders decide by subjecting their beliefs to a 
standard of proof in order to come to an unambiguous output. That is, 
at this point the law forces factfinders back into what looks like a two-
valued logic, by making them decide for one party or the other. 
The determined theorist could pursue the bivalent image of tradi-
tional probability. Then the ultimate task of applying a standard of 
proof would unavoidably involve placement on a scale of likelihood 
running from 0% to 100%.57 But I contend that speaking in terms of 
bivalent logic tends to mislead on standards. 
A better understanding of standards of proof would result from 
thinking in terms of multivalent logic and belief functions. Even though 
decisionmaking requires converting from a multivalent logic to an out-
put that sounds two-valued, the law does not need to require evidence 
to make the fact more likely than fifty percent or whatever. All the 
factfinder need do is compare the strengths of belief and disbelief. The 
path to decision might involve only comparing Bel(S) and Bel(notS) 
while ignoring the indeterminate belief. By requiring only a comparison, 
belief functions would never require placement on a scale of likelihood. 
The workings of this approach is the subject of the next Part. 
II. Burden of Persuasion 
This Part will use belief function theory to explain why the tradi-
tional view of the law’s burden of persuasion misrepresents the stan-
dards of proof. Then, this Part will demonstrate how the law actually 
conceives of its three standards of proof as different ways of comparing 
belief and disbelief. 
 
57. See, e.g., Brown v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 342, 345 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he trier 
of fact rules for the plaintiff if it thinks the chance greater than 0.5 that 
the plaintiff is in the right.”). 
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A. Traditional View 
Let me start with some background on how the law has 
traditionally viewed the burden of proof, say, in a jury trial. The burden 
of proof dictates who must produce evidence and ultimately persuade 
the jury on which elements of the case. Burden of proof thus encom-
passes two concepts: burden of production and burden of persuasion. 
The burden of production might require either party at a given time 
during trial to produce evidence on an element or suffer the judge’s 
adverse determination on that element; one party has the initial burden 
of production on any particular element, but that burden may shift 
during the trial if that party produces certain kinds or strengths of 
evidence. The burden of persuasion requires a certain party ultimately 
to persuade the jury of the truth of an element or suffer the jury’s 
adverse determination on that element. 
To convey the traditional view of the burden of persuasion, a 
diagram must represent the internal thought process of the factfinder 
in ultimately weighing the evidence. The following grid measures the 
factfinder’s view in a civil case of the evidential likelihood that the 
disputed fact exists, with likelihood increasing from 0% on the left to 
100% on the right. 
The plaintiff in an imagined civil trial starts at the left. By 
presenting evidence on the issue, he must get beyond the midpoint to 
win. That is, he must show that it is more likely than not that the 
disputed fact exists. If after the plaintiff has given his best shot the 
factfinder thinks that he has not passed the fifty-percent line, then the 
factfinder should decide for the defendant. 
This diagrammatic representation of the burden of persuasion app-
ears to be compatible with traditional probability. Even accepting the 
unrealism of a probabilistic theory, however, a qualification is necessary 
that this diagram serves mainly as an impetus to thinking about these 
matters rather than as a source of definitive statements thereon. 
The diagram can confuse. For example, the law handles a finding 
of equipoise in a civil case by means of the burden of persuasion. If the 
evidence ends up as evenly matched, the burden-bearer loses. That 
observation usually generates the reaction that the burden of persuasion 
does not matter much. After all, in theory, it should work only as a 
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tiebreaker in the highly unusual case of a precise tie. Yet, in practice, 
lawyers and judges fight and suffer over the burden of persuasion. Why? 
First, the diagram does not mean that a fifty-percent line exists in 
reality. The psychological truth is that equipoise is more of a zone, or 
range of probabilities, than a line. As already suggested, a useful way 
to envisage the whole scale of likelihood is as a set of fuzzy categories, 
or intervals, of likelihood.58 Each category, such as more likely than not, 
embodies some range of approximate likelihood. Equipoise is no differ-
ent from the other categories. A range of evidential states may strike 
the factfinder as evenly balanced. Equipoise being a zone means that 
the burden of persuasion will affect many more cases than those few in 
which the conflicting evidence results precisely in a dead heat.59 
Second, given the selection effect, close cases are common.60 Uneven 
cases falling far from the standard of proof tend to settle, while the 
cases where the parties can disagree on the predictions of outcome tend 
disproportionately to go to trial. 
Third, still other reasons for caring about the persuasion-burden lie 
in psychology. How the law frames a question—whether the plaintiff or 
the defendant bears the risk of nonpersuasion of a fact, that is, whether 
the plaintiff or the defendant appears to start from “zero”—matters.61 
An anchoring heuristic lowers the willingness of the factfinder to deter-
mine that the burdened party has prevailed, because people fail to 
adjust fully from a given starting point, even if the starting point was 
arbitrarily set.62 Another reason is that loss aversion, status quo bias, 
and omission bias make it difficult for the burdened party to carry the 
burden. The idea is that the disutility generated by a defendant’s loss 
 
58. Supra Part I.A.1. 
59. See United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen, 686 F.2d 1238, 1248 (7th Cir. 
1982) (stressing importance of the persuasion burden and observing that 
“a judge or a jury can experience only a small, finite number of degrees 
of certainty . . . . Thus cases when the evidence . . . seem[s] in balance are 
not unique among some infinite variety of evidentiary balances, but 
instead are among a much smaller number of [ranges of] possibilities that 
may be perceived by the fact-finder.”). 
60. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984) (presenting a nonrandom model of the 
relationship between disputes settled and disputes litigated, focusing on solely 
economic determinants and the parties’ rational estimates of the outcome). 
61. See Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Loss Aversion, Omission Bias, and the 
Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation, 41 J. Legal Stud. 165, 197 n.23 
(2012) (describing the challenge that placing the burden of proof on the 
plaintiff adds even with no heightened standard of persuasion). 
62. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science (n.s.) 1124, 1128 (1974) (describing 
the anchoring phenomenon that happens when people make estimates 
starting from an initial value). 
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of something by verdict exceeds the utility reaped from a plaintiff’s 
equal gain; that the burdened party seems undesirably intent on dis-
rupting the status quo; and that the factfinder’s harmful commission 
by making an award would inflict more cost psychologically than would 
its harmful omission. Accordingly, people perceive the loss to the defen-
dant by a judgment as larger than the gain to the plaintiff, while such 
a judgment requires the system to elevate action over inaction and so 
risk incurring regret costs.63 
Thus, the factfinder will rely on the burden of persuasion more often 
than one might imagine. But having to draw a fat fifty-percent line 
encourages a more general reconsideration of the proof standards. The 
conclusion will be that this diagram for the burden of persuasion is 
fundamentally misleading, in need of redrawing rather than mere refine-
ment. The redrawing will entail a reformulation of those standards into 
a diagram of belief functions. The law does not and should not conform 
to the traditional academic view. 
B. Reformulated View 
The traditional approach, reeking of probability theory, does not 
do a terribly good job of accounting for the usual state of evidence. It 
poses odd questions to the factfinder: given imperfect evidence, what is 
the chance the plaintiff is right in an absolute sense, and how does that 
chance compare to the applicable standard of proof? 
The law has settled on three standards of proof that apply in 
different circumstances: (1) The standard of preponderance of the evi-
dence translates into a more-likely-than-not standard. It is the usual 
standard in civil litigation, but it appears throughout law.64 (2) Next 
comes the intermediate standard or standards, often grouped under the 
banner of clear and convincing evidence and roughly translated as a 
much-more-likely-than-not standard. These variously phrased but equi-
valently applied standards govern on certain issues in special situations, 
such as when terminating parental rights.65 (3) The standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt means a virtual-certainty standard. It very 
rarely prevails outside criminal law.66 
In applying the standard, belief functions better reflect the fact-
finder’s actual frame of mind: some belief will remain uncommitted in 
the absence of perfect evidence. Instead of betting that Tom’s identity 
is or is not probable, the factfinder should think and speak in terms of 
 
63. See Schweizer, supra note 27, at 134–38 (explaining how cognitive 
psychological factors, like loss aversion, omission bias, and status quo bias, 
heighten the standard of proof). 
64. See Clermont, supra note 1, at 16–18 (outlining the debate over the 
meaning of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard). 
65. See id. at 23–25 (describing the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard). 
66. See id. at 26–31 (describing the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard). 
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degrees of belief. That is, on a fact to which the standard of proof 
applies, the belief function route is the one to take, rather than invoking 
a simplistic scale of likelihood. 
The factfinder would ask itself the natural question that the law 
seems to pose to it: do you believe the burdened party’s allegations 
more than you disbelieve them? The factfinder need not compose bett-
ing odds. (Nor does the factfinder have to follow the invented approach 
of relative plausibility. The other party does not have to choose and 
formulate a story. It can, even by silence, take advantage of disjunction 
if the factfinder disbelieves any element as much as or more than it 
believes the element.) 
Finally, belief functions could invoke the factfinder’s considerable 
powers of relative judgment rather than its absolute judgment of 
likelihood. What could the standards of proof mean in a comparative 
sense? To begin, what could preponderance of the evidence, or its trans-
lation as more likely than not, mean in a comparative sense? 
1. Preponderance of the Evidence 
One could measure the proof against some absolute threshold and 
require, say, that the evidence have some specified content. But for ages 
such a formulation has not accorded with the import of real cases. The 
law should be more comparative. It does not simply inquire which side 
has the stronger evidence, however. It looks instead to belief in the 
burdened party’s position.67 
The law could examine the belief for some absolute strength, say, 
requiring that Bel(S) exceed a fifty-percent likelihood. But it does not 
require the completeness of proof that would be necessary to get a belief 
above fifty percent. It is willing to rest decisions on the evidence pre-
sented. Accordingly, any talk of requiring elements to exceed fifty per-
cent is misleading. The better approach is more directly to invoke the 
more powerful human ability of relative judgment by comparing beliefs. 
One could compare Bel(S) relative to Bel(notS).68 In comparing 
them, Bel(notS) is the belief in the negation of S, not the complement 
of Bel(S). It represents how much the factfinder actively disbelieves S, 
the fact in dispute. The factfinder should ignore uncommitted belief 
and then compare the affirmative belief to any belief in its contra-
diction. 
The comparison thus should look at actual belief in S and actual 
disbelief of S. If the factfinder were to work with only those two beliefs, 
 
67. See J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 
242, 248–49 (1944) (examining what level of proof a factfinder needs to 
believe in the burdened party’s position). 
68. See Cohen, supra note 50, at 255 (“The cardinal question to be settled 
by the trier of fact may always be construed as this: on the facts before 
the court, is the conclusion to be proved by the plaintiff more inductively 
probable than its negation?”). 
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and discard the indeterminate belief, the most obvious course in civil 
cases would be to say that the burdened party should win if and only 
if Bel(S) > Bel(notS). The factfinder would decide for the plaintiff if 
Bel(S) exceeds Bel(notS), but decide for the defendant if Bel(S) does 
not exceed Bel(notS). This standard not only is readily comprehensible 
but also avoids any need to quantify the beliefs. 
Although belief functions do not require placement on a scale, the 
factfinder in effect might end in believing the burdened plaintiff’s 
position on a disputed fact to be only “substantially possible” on the 
coarse scale of seven gradations. That situation does not mean that the 
plaintiff should lose, however. The factfinder might, if forced to express 
likelihood, believe the falsity of the plaintiff’s position merely to a 
“reasonable possibility.” The plaintiff should win, by use of belief func-
tions. All the factfinder must do is to compare belief and disbelief: all 
that preponderance of the evidence requires is that the strength of the 
factfinder’s belief that the plaintiff is right must exceed its belief that 
the plaintiff is wrong. Belief functions so add the idea that the factfinder 
in such a case must have a belief in the element’s truth stronger than 
his belief in its falsity; while some of the factfinder’s belief remains 
uncommitted, it did find the plaintiff’s position to be a good one in the 
sense of more likely true than false. Sometimes, then, we would be talk-
ing of whether the smallish belief exceeds its smallish contradiction. 
The comparative approach to the civil standard of proof means that 
the nonburdened party does not need to develop a competing version 
of the truth, but can rely on negation of any element. A belief in the 
falsity of the burdened party’s version of the truth may develop natur-
ally in the course of trial. It could arise even upon hearing only the 
burdened party’s evidence. Any evidence from the nonburdened party 
should contribute to raising Bel(notS). 
Relatedly, the nonburdened party need not fight imaginary fights. 
Some scholars worry that looking at negation puts the burdened party 
in the impossible situation of disproving every alternative possibility.69 
But that worry comes from confusing lack of belief with disbelief. 
Disbelieving S entails the degree to which the factfinder thinks S is 
false. The mere possibility of other states of the world in which S is not 
true go into the uncommitted belief, not usually into Bel(notS); recall 
that the possibility of notS equals Bel(notS) plus the uncommitted 
belief; again, the degree of believing that Tom is not the perpetrator is 
quite different from envisaging the chance that he is possibly not the 
perpetrator. The proposed comparison involves the belief in notS, and 
does not involve the possibility of notS. 
Not only does this comparative approach comport with the natural 
cognitive method that follows from telling the factfinders they must 
 
69. See, e.g., Pardo, supra note 7, at 1093–94 (observing this paradox created 
by a probabilistic approach to the more-likely-than-not standard, and so 
proposing a relative plausibility approach). 
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look to their beliefs and then decide for one side or the other, but also 
it does nothing to interfere with the current procedural and substantive 
functioning of the standard of proof. Picture a normalization process of 
disregarding the indeterminate beliefs and scaling Bel(S) and Bel(notS) 
up proportionately so that they add to 1. Call the recalculations b(S) 
and b(notS). If Bel(S)=.50 and Bel(notS)=.20, then b(S)=.71 and 
b(notS)=.29. These new numbers represent much less mental distance 
from the traditional view of standards of proof, because b(S) > b(notS) 
if and only if b(S) > .50. Thus, preponderance could retain a conno-
tation of likelihood exceeding fifty percent. This normalization renders 
the reformulation much less jarring, and it also demonstrates that I did 
not pull the reformulation out of thin air. 
Furthermore, something about the traditional view of the prepon-
derance standard as a showing of a probability greater than fifty percent 
just seems appropriate for civil cases: among competing fixed standards, 
it minimizes the expected number of erroneous decisions and also the 
expected sum of wrongful amounts of damages, which is a goal that the 
law has chosen to pursue by its civil standard. The reformulated stand-
ard has the same error-cost minimizing properties, but achieves them 
in the real world where the assumption of bivalence does not hold and 
where considerable indeterminacy prevails. For an idea of a proof adapt-
ed from the probabilists’ proof,70 let b(S)=p be the apparent probability 
that the defendant is liable (for D dollars). If Bel(S) > Bel(notS), then 
p > ½; call p by the name p1 in that case. If Bel(S)  Bel(notS), call it 
p2. On the one hand, under the preponderance standard, the expected 
sum of false positives and false negatives over the run of cases is [(1 – 
p1)D + p2D]. On the other hand, under a very high standard that 
eliminates false positives, the analogous sum is [p1D + p2D]. Therefore, 
given that (1 – p1) is less than p1, the reformulated preponderance 
standard lowers the system’s expected error costs. 
Finally, one of civil procedure’s most fundamental principles is that, 
where possible, the parties should ordinarily receive equal treatment 
and bear equal risk. The common law has long championed the tradit-
ional view of the preponderance rule as a manifestation of that prin-
ciple. By comparing belief to disbelief, the reformulated standard pre-
serves the level playing field. 
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence 
Now, as to the other standards of proof, clear and convincing evid-
ence should mean Bel(S) >> Bel(notS).71 This standard would not be 
 
70. See supra note 27 (discussing the preponderance standard as a p > 0.5 
approach). 
71. See McBaine, supra note 67, at 263 (proposing an instruction to the effect 
that “the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater 
than the probability that they are false or do not exist”); Edmund M. 
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that difficult to apply. We are quite used to such a standard of being 
clearly convinced, in life and in law. Judges apply it on a motion for a 
new trial based on the verdict’s being against the weight of the 
evidence. Appellate courts use it in reviewing judge-found facts. Those 
standards of decision mean that it is not enough to disagree with the 
jury or the judge, and instead the reviewer must think there was a 
serious error. 
However, I admit that the cases do not make perfectly evident what 
clear and convincing means. Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, it 
imposes a requirement about the completeness of evidence. It may re-
quire admission of enough evidence to reduce uncommitted belief to the 
point that Bel(S) exceeds the possibility of notS. I am open to those 
viewpoints, but unconvinced so far. In the meantime, one could par-
tially capture the standard by explicating clear and convincing to the 
factfinder as the standard that lies between preponderance and reason-
able doubt. 
3. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
As to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it is demanding of course. 
It must require more than Bel(S) >> Bel(notS). Indeed, proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt seems to differ in kind, suggesting that it is not 
simply Bel(S) >>> Bel(notS). Instead, by placing separate demands 
on Bel(S) and Bel(notS), the criminal standard should mean that no 
great uncommitted belief remains and that no reasonable doubt per-
sists.72 
“No great uncommitted belief” reflects the idea that Bel(S) cannot 
be weak, measured in an absolute sense. We do not want to convict 
when, although there is some evidence of guilt, we really do not know 
what happened. The belief in guilt must outweigh all alternative possi-
bilities, including fanciful ones. The belief in guilt must at least exceed 
the possibility of innocence, so that Bel(S) > .50. Given the usual limits 
on available evidence, achieving such a high degree of absolute belief 
represents a demanding standard.73  
Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 
47 Harv. L. Rev. 59, 67 (1933) (“its truth is much more probable than 
its falsity”); cf. Laudan, supra note 8, at 299–300 (discussing attempts to 
append such notions to the approach of inference to the best explanation). 
72. See Pardo, supra note 20, at 1829 & n.142 (seeing the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard as imposing a double requirement). 
73. On justifying what some may still consider a low threshold, Bel(S) > .50, 
see Larry Laudan & Harry D. Saunders, Re-thinking the Criminal Standard 
of Proof: Seeking Consensus About the Utilities of Trial Outcomes,  
7 Int’l Comment. on Evidence iss. 2, art. 1 (2009), at 3, 14–17, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1369996 [http:// 
perma.cc/N4MN-J8UR] (analyzing burdens of proof by comparing the costs 
and benefits of convictions and acquittals that may or may not be accurate). 
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“No reasonable doubt” means that no reasonable person could hold 
Bel(notS) > 0. On the view that anything is possible, zero as a coarsely 
gradated degree of belief equates to a slightest possibility. Bel(notS) > 
0 thus refers to a step up from the slightest possibility of innocence. 
Consequently, that no reasonable person could hold Bel(notS) > 0 act-
ually means that no reasonable factfinder should see a reasonable 
possibility of innocence. In other words, for a conviction the prosecutor 
must show that no reasonable possibility of innocence exists.74 
III. Burden of Production 
This Part will use belief function theory to explain why the tradi-
tional view of the law’s burden of production tends slightly to mislead. 
Then, this Part will demonstrate why the law’s initial burden of pro-
duction starts the factfinders at point zero. 
A. Traditional View 
In going from discussing the burden of persuasion to explaining the 
academic view of the burden of production, I need to use a different 
diagram. This one represents the role of the judge in patrolling the 
extreme outer limits of rationality on the jury’s task of applying the 
standard of proof. 
Imagine a single disputed issue of typical fact, S, on which the 
plaintiff bears the initial burden of production and the burden of pers-
uasion. Then imagine a grid representing the judge’s disagreement with 
a potential verdict for the plaintiff, or equivalently the judge’s view of 
likelihood of error in such a verdict, with disagreement or likelihood 
decreasing from one on the left to zero on the right.75 It is important to 
 
74. See Allen & Leiter, supra note 20, at 1528 (saying that the prosecution 
must “show that there is no plausible account of innocence”); McBaine, 
supra note 67, at 266 (proposing an instruction to the effect that a 
reasonable doubt exists when “you cannot honestly say that it is almost 
certain that the defendant did the acts which he is charged to have done”); 
cf. Laudan, supra note 8, at 300–02 (discussing attempts to append such 
a notion to the approach of inference to the best explanation). 
75. See 9 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2487 (James H. Chadbourn ed. 1981) 
(providing a diagram representing the interactions between judicial rulings 
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realize that this diagram represents the likelihood of jury error in 
finding that the disputed fact exists, not the judge’s view of the evid-
ential likelihood that the disputed fact exists. In other words, this dia-
gram represents the judge’s thought process in externally overseeing 
the jury that acts as factfinder, not the judge’s thought process as if 
the judge were finding facts. Alternatively stated, this diagram repre-
sents the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion. 
The plaintiff in the imagined case starts at the left of the diagram. 
If he presents no evidence, the judge would ordinarily grant a motion 
for judgment as a matter of law against him. He is consequently bound 
to go forward with his evidence until he satisfies the judge that a reason-
able jury would be warranted in finding for him. That is, he must get 
to line X in order to make a jury question of the imagined single issue 
of fact, doing so by presenting evidence. The plaintiff’s getting to or 
beyond line X means that although the judge might still disagree with 
a verdict for the plaintiff, the judge thinks a reasonable jury could find 
that the plaintiff sustained his persuasion-burden, and therefore the 
judge will hold that the plaintiff sustained his production-burden. If the 
plaintiff does not get to line X, the judge would so vehemently disagree 
with a verdict for the plaintiff as to consider the jury irrational, and so 
the judge can grant the motion for judgment as a matter of law. Line 
X, again, represents the judge’s view on the limit of rationality in the 
jury’s finding for the plaintiff, rather than the judge’s view of the evid-
ential likelihood that the disputed fact exists. For example, if the judge 
disbelieved all of the plaintiff’s abundant evidence, but still acknowledg-
ed that a reasonable jury could believe it, then the judge should rule 
that the plaintiff has carried his production-burden, because a reason-
able jury could conclude that the plaintiff sustained his persuasion-
burden. 
If the plaintiff produces enough evidence to get beyond point Y, he 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in his favor unless the defen-
dant comes forward with enough evidence to push the case back to 
point Y. If the defendant so succeeds in carrying her burden of pro-
duction, it is again a case for the jury. She may, however, be so success-
ful that her evidence carries the case beyond point X. If so, the defen-
dant becomes entitled to judgment as a matter of law unless the 
plaintiff in his turn comes forward with more evidence. If, at the close 
of all the evidence, the case lies between points X and Y, it goes to the 
jury and the plaintiff has the persuasion-burden. He will lose if the jury 
is not persuaded. 
As a theoretical matter, the production-burden may thus shift sev-
eral times with the pull and haul of the evidence. As a practical matter, 
however, such multiple shifting on a single issue of fact is very unlikely. 
 
and evidentiary burdens); cf. John T. McNaughton, Burden of Production 
of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 
1382 (1955) (offering alternative diagrams). 
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The reason is that conflicting evidence on a single issue would, in most 
realistic settings, remain in the realm where decision is properly for the 
jury: a reasonable jury could find either way, and so the judge should 
not grant judgment as a matter of law. Thus the pull and haul of the 
evidence will result only in oscillation within the jury’s realm. 
This diagrammatic scheme works pretty well to represent the law’s 
approach. Moreover, the diagram helps in understanding other concepts 
and special rules. A permissive inference (and res ipsa loquitur is one 
in the view of most courts76) describes an inference that a jury is author-
ized but not required to draw from certain evidence; in other words, 
the inference satisfies the plaintiff’s production-burden by getting the 
case to line X, although not beyond line Y. A true presumption (such 
as the presumption against suicide as the cause of death) shifts the 
burden of production to the opponent after the introduction of the 
evidential premise; in other words, the presumption puts the case  
to the right of line Y and so requires the jury to find the presumed  
fact, unless the opponent introduces enough evidence to carry her 
production-burden and push the case at least back into the jury zone 
between Y and X.77 
Most significant among special rules, certain kinds of evidence will 
not satisfy a burden of production. To satisfy that burden, the burdened 
party cannot rely on the opponent’s failure to testify,78 on mere disbelief 
of the opposing testimony,79 or on demeanor evidence drawn from the 
opponent’s testimony.80 Similarly, naked statistical evidence normally 
will not satisfy the burden of production.81 However, any of these kinds 
 
76. See John Farley Thorne III, Comment, Mathematics, Fuzzy Negligence, and 
the Logic of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 147 (1980) (justifying 
the doctrine by use of fuzzy logic). 
77. See Fed. R. Evid. 301 (“In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these 
rules provide otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed 
has the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this 
rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party 
who had it originally.”). 
78. See Stimpson v. Hunter, 125 N.E. 155, 157 (Mass. 1919) (“The failure of 
the defendant and of his son to testify although present in court was not 
equivalent to affirmative proof of facts necessary to maintain the action.”). 
79. See Cruzan v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 116 N.E. 879, 880 
(Mass. 1917) (“Mere disbelief of denials of facts which must be proved is 
not the equivalent of affirmative evidence in support of those facts.”). 
80. See Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268–69 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding 
that although demeanor evidence is probative, it does not suffice to escape 
a summary judgment). 
81. See Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 406 F.2d 1315, 1318 (3d Cir. 1969) 
(dictum) (saying, in a case where the plaintiff had been injured by an 
exploding tire, that a seventy-five to eighty percent chance it came from 
the defendant manufacturer was not enough for the case to go to the jury). 
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of evidence is perfectly proper to introduce as a supplement to positive 
evidence that satisfies the burden of production.82 The idea behind these 
special rules is that they are necessary to protect the notion of a burden 
of production. 
Why protect the burden of production? The reason is that it serves 
important functions. It facilitates early termination of weak claims or 
defenses, safeguards against irrational error, and effectuates other pro-
cess and outcome values.83 In the absence of these special rules, any 
burdened party could produce enough evidence to reach the factfinder, 
this evidence possibly being merely in the form of silence, disbelief, 
demeanor, or general statistics (such as that the defendant manufac-
tured sixty percent of the supply of the injury-causing device of 
unknown provenance). Perhaps we harbor a special fear of the fact-
finder’s mishandling of such weak evidence when undiluted by other 
admitted evidence and consequently rendering an unreasoned decision 
for the proponent based either on prejudice without regard to the evi-
dence or on undue deference to such bewildering evidence. To avoid 
such an outcome, and to ensure that the burden of production means 
something, the judge should require sufficient evidence of other kinds. 
Once the proponent clears that hurdle, the tribunal should allow the 
feared evidence its probative effect. 
B. Reformulated View 
At least at first glance, the accepted scheme seems fairly compatible 
with traditional probability. The only diagrammatic qualification would 
be that representing the judge’s view of jury error as a series of fuzzy 
intervals rather than lines would better capture reality. The leftmost 
judge zone would correspond to slightest possibility and the rightmost 
to almost certainty. The jury zone would run from reasonable possi-
bility all the way to high probability, albeit subject to a motion for new 
trial. 
A difficulty for traditional probability in this area is fixing the start-
ing point for factfinding. The probabilist might assume that when you 
know nothing, the rational starting point is fifty percent.84 Indeed, some 
experimental evidence indicates that lay people do tend to start at fifty 
 
For a more complete consideration of statistical evidence and its ultimately 
nonparadoxical nature, see Field et al., supra note 6, at 1314–19 (explaining 
how a factfinder converts statistical evidence into a belief). 
82. See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316–20 (1976) (treating 
failure to testify as supplemental evidence). 
83. See Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea 
for “Process Values,” 60 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1974) (discussing generally 
the importance of “process values”). 
84. Supra Part I.A.3.  
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percent.85 Then, if the plaintiff offers a feather’s weight of evidence, he 
in theory would thereby carry not only his burden of production but 
also his burden of persuasion. 
The real-life judge, however, hands only defeat to the plaintiff with 
nothing more than a feather’s weight of evidence, and does so by 
summary means. Why is that? The reason is that the factfinder should 
start not at fifty percent but at the far left, and to get to X requires 
more than a feather’s weight. The proper representation of lack of proof 
is zero belief in the plaintiff’s position—but also zero belief in the defen-
dant’s position. The full range of belief is properly uncommitted.86 That 
insight makes sense of the notion of the burden of production. It also 
suggests that, in starting at zero belief, the law is proceeding by belief 
function theory. 
Thus, the paradoxical difficulties in applying the burden of 
production to weak proof dissipate. For an example, imagine a directed 
verdict motion by a civil defendant in a single-issue case. This example 
meshes the burden of production with the new view of the preponder-
ance standard. The motion requires the judge to ask if no reasonable 
jury could find for the burdened plaintiff by viewing Bel(S) > 
Bel(notS).87 At the end of the plaintiff’s case, if a maximally reasonable 
Bel(notS) is zero (effectively a slightest possibility), then the inequality 
requires a minimally reasonable Bel(S) to exceed zero (effectively a rea-
sonable possibility). That the plaintiff must have established a reason-
able possibility is the embodiment of the burden of production, and it 
is what keeps the plaintiff from surviving with a mere feather’s weight 
 
85. See Anne W. Martin & David A. Schum, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: 
A Likelihood Ratio Approach, 27 Jurimetrics J. 383, 390–93 (1987) 
(surveying a small sample of students for their odds of guilt used as the 
prior probability, which turned out to be 1:1 or fifty percent). 
86. Cf. Larry Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law 104–06 (2006) 
(parsing the presumption of innocence to mean an epistemic blank slate). 
87. The reference to a “reasonable” jury reflects the fact that on such a motion 
the judge is reviewing the jury’s hypothesized application of the standard 
of proof. The judge’s standard of decision turns on whether a jury could not 
reasonably, or rationally, find for the nonmovant. That is, the defendant 
must show that a verdict for the plaintiff, given the standard of proof, is 
not reasonably possible. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure’s Magical 
Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 Cornell 
L. Rev. 1115, 1126–27 (1987) (discussing when a judge should grant a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law). We can state this standard of 
review simply in terms of the law’s coarsely gradated scale of possibilities 
and probabilities, without the complications that belief functions impose on 
the standard of proof. The reason is that we do not expect the judge to 
retain uncommitted belief in applying a standard of review. The “evidence” 
for applying the standard is complete. We want from the judge the likelihood 
of jury error in finding for the plaintiff, with the complement being the likeli-
hood that the jury has authority to find for the plaintiff. 
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of evidence. An illustrative situation would be where the plaintiff has 
produced only a little evidence, but it is “pure” evidence that gives the 
defendant no support.88 If a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff 
on such proof, the judge should deny the directed verdict motion. If the 
defendant then produces no effective evidence during the rest of the 
trial, but moves again for a directed verdict at the end of all the evid-
ence, the judge should deny the motion and the case should go to the 
jury. The jury, if it were to take the same view of the evidence as the 
judge hypothesized, could find for the plaintiff—even on such thin evid-
ence. 
In sum, once one recognizes that the burden of persuasion is a com-
parative operation on sometimes thin evidence, the notion of a burden 
of production becomes a necessary one. The judge must patrol the suff-
iciency of the evidence to ensure that there is rationally enough to 
warrant the factfinder’s applying the burden of persuasion. Otherwise 
the factfinder might irrationally begin at fifty percent or rely on very 
slim evidence. 
IV. Overview of Standards of Proof 
My views, then, are not at all subversive. Overall I merely contend, 
in accordance with belief functions’ teaching, that the law charges fact-
finders to form a coarsely gradated degree of belief in the burdened 
party’s position, while leaving some belief uncommitted in the face of 
imperfect evidence, and then apply the standard of proof by comparing 
that belief to their coarsely gradated belief in its negation. Many observ-
ers of the legal system would find that contention, putting its slightly 
new vocabulary to the side, unobjectionable. 
A. Compatibility of Reformulated and Current Standards 
A reader always entertains the temptation, upon seeing what looks 
like a plea for reconceptualization, to dismiss it as a pie-in-the-sky aca-
demic musing. When the reconceptualization involves the standards of 
proof, the specialists have the added temptation of dismissing it as 
another of the common anti-probabilist rants or pro-probabilist paeans. 
After all, if my view were a sound one, someone would have come up 
with it before. So I hasten to undercut my contribution by stressing 
that my ideas are not that new. I am trying little more than to explain 
what the law has been doing all along. 
The easiest way to convey the lack of newness is to refer back to 
the normalization process that converts beliefs into probabilistic out-
puts.89 That process allows expression consistent with traditional prob-
ability theory. Yet, I resist taking that normalization route for ordinary  
88. See Liu & Yager, supra note 46, at 18–19 (discussing Liebniz’s notions of 
pure and mixed evidence). 
89. See supra Part II.B.1.  
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use. First, converting to additive beliefs loses information and would 
reintroduce the probabilistic imaging that originally led to the problems 
and paradoxes of the traditional view. Second, normalization requires 
quantification of Bel(S) and Bel(notS), a complicated step otherwise 
unnecessary, and a step that is much more difficult for humans to 
perform than simply comparing beliefs. Third, I contend that directly 
comparing Bel(S) and Bel(notS) actually conforms better to the actual 
law’s instructions than normalization does.  
Now take a look at practice. Courts sometimes express divergent 
views of the standard of proof. Some writers have concluded that courts 
interpret preponderance in one of three ways: (1) “more convincing,” 
which requires the burdened party to tell a better tale than the oppo-
nent tells; (2) “more likely than not,” which requires a showing of the 
fact’s existence stronger than the showing of its nonexistence; or (3) 
“really happened,” which requires a showing by evidence of what 
probably transpired outside in the real world.90 The reformulated stan-
dard would conform to the middle option, rather than either (1) the 
comparison of relative plausibility theory or (3) the absolute measure 
of probability theory. The evidence at trial will support S to an extent 
while supporting notS to another extent, and the reformulated standard 
says that the factfinder need only compare these two beliefs. 
Consider a couple of classic cases on how option (2) gets applied. 
In Livanovitch v. Livanovitch, 91  the trial court gave the following 
charge: “If . . . you are more inclined to believe from the evidence that 
he did so deliver the bonds to the defendant, even though your belief is 
only the slightest degree greater than that he did not, your verdict 
should be for the plaintiff.”92 The appellate court said: 
The instruction was not erroneous. It was but another way of 
saying that the slightest preponderance of the evidence in his 
favor entitled the plaintiff to a verdict . . . . All that is required 
in a civil case of one who has the burden of proof is that he 
establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence . . . . 
When the equilibrium of proof is destroyed, and the beam inclines 
toward him who has the burden, however slightly, he has satisfied 
the requirement of the law, and is entitled to the verdict. “A bare 
preponderance is sufficient, though the scales drop but a feather’s 
weight.” This rule accords with the practice in this state as 
 
90. See, e.g., J.S. Covington, Jr., The Structure of Legal Argument 
and Proof 99–100 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the three explanations courts 
have given of the term “preponderance of evidence”). 
91. 131 A. 799 (Vt. 1926). 
92. Id. at 800. 
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remembered by the justices of this court, and is well supported 
by the authorities.93 
In Lampe v. Franklin American Trust Co.,94 one of the defendant’s 
contentions was that the note in suit had been altered after it had been 
signed by the defendant’s decedent. The trial court refused the defen-
dant’s request for an instruction that the jury should find that the in-
strument was not the decedent’s note “if you find and believe that it is 
more probable that such changes or alterations have been made in the 
instrument after it was signed by the deceased and without his know-
ledge and consent, than it is that such alterations and changes were 
made at or about the time that the deceased signed the instrument and 
under his direction and with his knowledge and consent.”95 Holding the 
denial of that instruction to have been proper, the appellate court said: 
The trouble with this statement is that a verdict must be based 
upon what the jury finds to be facts rather than what they find 
to be “more probable.” . . . This means merely that the party, 
who has the burden of proof, must produce evidence, tending to 
show the truth of those facts, “which is more convincing to them 
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition 
thereto.”96 
These two cases’ formulations sound contradictory. But if one inter-
prets the quotations as speaking in terms of the coarsely gradated belief 
in the fact compared with the coarsely gradated belief in the fact’s 
negation, based on the evidence presented, the apparent contradiction 
evaporates. They both seem to be saying that the burdened party 
should win if and only if Bel(S) > Bel(notS). 
In the end, I submit that comparison of coarsely gradated beliefs is 
the most accurate representation of what the law tells a factfinder to 
do with a standard of proof. In civil cases, when the judge explains 
preponderance of the evidence, the explanation should convey the idea 
that the factfinder has to find that Bel(S) is more likely than not, which 
means Bel(S) > Bel(notS). 
To say it differently: if you were to put the evidence favorable to 
plaintiff and the evidence favorable to defendant on opposite sides 
of the scales, plaintiff would have to make the scales tip somewhat 
 
93. Id. 
94. 96 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. 1936). 
95. Id. at 723. 
96. Id. (quoting Rouchene v. Gamble Constr. Co., 89 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Mo. 1935)). 
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on his side. If plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the verdict must 
be for defendant.97 
Or, preponderance means that the evidence “produces in your 
minds belief that what is sought to be proved is more likely true than 
not true”98 or “more probably true than false.”99 By literally instructing 
factfinders to decide between S and notS, already the law effectively 
urges them to focus on belief and disbelief, and then compare them. 
B. Application of Reformulated Standards to Multiple Elements 
I have written extensively on how to conjoin findings on multiple 
elements.100 Using fuzzy logic, I showed how using the product rule to 
multiply probabilities is improper for factfinding, and thus resolved the 
so-called conjunction paradox (which posits that if the factfinder 
proceeds element-by-element and the cause of action entails more than 
one element, no assurance exists that the product of the elements’ 
likelihoods will meet the standard of proof).101 The conjunction and dis-
junction functions work this way for sets in fuzzy logic, when x and y 
can take any truth value from zero to one and where these two rules 
are called the MIN and MAX rules: 
truth(x AND y) = minimum(truth(x), truth(y)) 
truth(x OR y) = maximum(truth(x), truth(y)) 
One big reason not to apply the product rule in conjoining elements 
is the mathematical fact that the product rule works only in an additive 
regime where the convincingness of a proposition implies the comple-
mentary likelihood of its contradiction. Given scarce information or 
conflicting evidence, however, a factfinder’s belief in x does not imply 
anything about a belief in notx, other than that the contradiction 
cannot be more likely than x’s complement, or one minus the belief in 
x. Even when factfinding entails a yes-or-no issue, the complement rep-
resents not contradiction but only what is not known. One would need 
 
97. Model Civil Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the 
Third Circuit ¶ 1.10 (2015). 
98. 3 O’Malley et al., supra note 23, § 104.01; see 4 Leonard B. Sand 
et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions: Civil ¶ 73-2 (2015) (“To 
establish a fact by a preponderance of evidence means to prove that the 
fact is more likely true than not true.”). 
99. Nissho-Iwai Co. v. M/T Stolt Lion, 719 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The 
term ‘preponderance’ means that ‘upon all the evidence . . . the facts 
asserted by the plaintiff are more probably true than false.’” (quoting 
Porter v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 387 F.2d 409, 411 (3d Cir. 1968))). 
100. See supra note 6 (citing two articles that the author wrote on the topic 
of how to conjoin findings on multiple elements). 
101. Id. 
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proof or inference of the contradiction before generating any belief in 
it. One forms a belief in a proposition as a partial truth, while leaving 
a lot of belief uncommitted. Because the partial truth does not measure 
the truth of its contradiction, one should not account for the contra-
diction in combining partial truths. Instead, one should combine beliefs 
by stringing them together into a chain, with the conjunction of these 
elements being as true as the weakest link. 
Under the MIN rule, if and only if each element passes the standard 
of proof, the conjoined elements meet the standard of proof. The con-
joined story of liability will not only be the most believable story, but 
will be more believable than all the stories of nonliability combined. To 
minimize error costs in these circumstances, the law should decide in 
conformity with the stronger belief. If the plaintiff so satisfies the stand-
ard, giving the plaintiff a recovery and the defendant a loss would be 
economically efficient. Refusing to accept the MIN rule’s version of the 
overall truth will always involve choosing a lesser truth at some step in 
telling the combined story of a series of two, or more, elements. 
Suppose that someone has seriously injured Katie, in circumstances 
suggesting negligence. She sues Tom, which means that she must prove 
his identity as the tortfeasor—as well as fault, causation, and injury. 
She introduces a fair amount of evidence. First, the factfinder would 
assess that evidence and might conclude as follows: (1) The evidence 
points to Tom being the perpetrator. If the factfinder were to speak in 
terms comprehensible to a bettor, he would put the odds at 3:2, or sixty 
percent. Using words, he would say that Tom was probably the 
perpetrator. (2) The question of fault was a tough one. There are uncer-
tainties as to what was done, but there is also a vagueness concerning 
how wrongful the supposed acts really were. The factfinder needs 
commensurable measures, so that he can evaluate a mix of random and 
nonrandom uncertainty. If forced to assess all the evidence on this issue 
and put it on a scale of truth running from zero to one, he would say 
.7. He might feel more comfortable saying fault was probable or more. 
(3) The acts, whatever they were, apparently caused the injury. Proxi-
mate cause is about as vague and multivalent as a legal concept can 
get. The factfinder is pretty convinced nevertheless. He would put caus-
ation at .8, or highly probable. (4) Katie’s injuries are not really very 
vague or uncertain. He would put this element of the tort at a .9 prob-
ability, or almost beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The factfinder may want to combine these findings. They are a 
mixture of probabilities and degrees of truth. But viewing them all as 
degrees of truth invokes the MIN operator, so that he can say that 
Katie’s story comes in at .6, or probable. Katie should win, by use of 
fuzzy logic. 
However, I am contending here that the better approach would be 
to look at the four findings through the lens of belief functions. The 
four findings should be thought of and stated as degrees of belief, which 
would be markedly lower than the probabilities that do not leave 
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uncommitted belief. Recall that factfinders sense their beliefs and 
disbeliefs based on the available evidence; they might believe a fact 
more than they disbelieve it, even if they would not be willing to bet 
on it as more likely than not if the truth could somehow be revealed; 
and the belief might be quite weak as it rests only on what evidence is 
available, while the bet must commit total belief to either yes or no. 
Note well that belief functions do not require quantification of beliefs 
and disbeliefs. Nonetheless, for the purposes of discussion, let us say 
that the hypothetical’s belief functions work out this way: (1) The belief 
that Tom was the perpetrator is .35, while .25 is the disbelief. (2) As 
to fault, Bel(fault) might be .50, while .20 is Bel(nofault). (3) Causation 
is clearer, with Bel(cause) being .70, while .15 is Bel(nocause). (4) 
Injury is clearer still, with Bel(injury) being .85, while .05 is 
Bel(noinjury). Katie should win by an element-by-element application 
of the standard of proof to the beliefs and disbeliefs. 
What if the factfinder were to apply the standard of proof to Katie’s 
combined story? How does belief function theory combine the beliefs? 
It would be disquieting if switching from the theory of fuzzy logic to 
belief functions produced a different resolution to the conjunction para-
dox. Happily, the resolution remains much the same. Fuzzy logic and 
belief functions are fundamentally compatible, being two similar ways 
to account for uncertainty.102 
One way to show the similarity of their approaches to conjunction 
would be to convert the beliefs into fuzzy findings at the decisional 
stage. The law forces a binary decision. Theorists separate out the 
credal stage, where the factfinder works with beliefs, from the pignistic 
stage, where the factfinder must make a decision.103 I have argued that 
the decision comes by comparing Bel(S) to Bel(notS) for each element. 
Instead, the beliefs could be normalized, and the decision would turn 
 
102. See Didier Dubois & Henri Prade, A Set-Theoretic View of Belief Functions: 
Logical Operations and Approximations by Fuzzy Sets, in Classic 
Works of the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions 375 
(Ronald R. Yager & Liping Liu eds., 2008) (arguing for the basic 
compatibility of fuzzy logic and belief functions); see also Schum, supra 
note 40, at 266–69 (observing that one can fuzzify belief functions); John 
Yen, Generalizing the Dempster-Shafer Theory to Fuzzy Sets, in Classic 
Works of the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions 529 
(Ronald R. Yager & Liping Liu eds., 2008) (showing how to form beliefs 
about membership in a fuzzy set). 
103. See Philippe Smets & Robert Kennes, The Transferable Belief Model, in 
Classic Works of the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions 
693, 703–11 (Ronald R. Yager & Liping Liu eds., 2008); cf. Michael S. 
Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 
547 (2013) (calling these two stages the micro-level and the macro-level of 
proof); supra note 33 (separating evidence-processing from application of 
the standard of proof). 
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on whether the normalized b(S) exceeds b(notS).104 To get the conjoined 
b(liable), the b(S) for each element would combine by the MIN operator. 
Here, b(liable) is .58. The conjoined b(liable) will meet the standard of 
proof if and only if the b(S) for each element met the standard of proof. 
But how does one more technically conjoin belief functions? The 
heavy theoretical work on belief functions consists mainly of developing 
tools for combining pieces of evidence to determine a combined belief. 
For the most part, the prominent Dempster-Shafer rule governs the 
task.105 That rule is very complicated, because it abstractly addresses 
the problem in the most general terms possible (Bayes’ theorem turns 
out to be a special case of that approach).106 
Conjoining findings and disjoining findings on elements are simpler, 
however, than the more general problem of updating beliefs as more 
evidence comes in. Further, shifting the image from mathematical 
formulas to set theory makes the solution still easier to picture.107 The 
situation is that the plaintiff must prove the conjunction of elements; 
and the defendant gets to rely on the disjunction, winning if the fact-
finder disbelieves any element as much as or more than it believes the 
element. Combined beliefs and disbeliefs on multiple elements appear 
as a new belief function. At a rough and ready level, the lower prob-
ability will be the minimum of the conjoined affirmative beliefs and the 
upper probability will be the maximum of the disjoined disbeliefs.108 On 
our hypothetical, Bel(liable)=.35 and Bel(notliable)=.25. 
 
104. See Nicholas J.J. Smith, Degree of Belief Is Expected Truth Value, in 
Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic 491, 503 
(Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi eds., 2010) (describing a betting 
scheme based on such comparison). 
105. See Shafer, supra note 34, at 6, 57–67 (using orthogonal sums); Barnett, 
supra note 38, at 198–204. By the Dempster-Shafer rule, “we construct a 
belief function to represent the new evidence and combine it with our 
‘prior’ belief function—i.e., with the belief function that represents our 
prior opinions. This method deals symmetrically with the new evidence 
and the old evidence on which our prior opinions are based: both bodies 
of evidence are represented by belief functions, and the result of the 
combination does not depend on which evidence is the old and which is 
the new.” Shafer, supra note 34, at 25. 
106. See Glenn Shafer & Amos Tversky, Languages and Designs for Probability 
Judgment, in Classic Works of the Dempster-Shafer Theory of 
Belief Functions 345 (Ronald R. Yager & Liping Liu eds., 2008) (comparing 
Bayesian probability judgments and belief functions). 
107. See Huber, supra note 26, at 10–15 (discussing the use of possibility theory 
for this purpose). 
108. See id. at 14. He suggests that the belief measure, or the necessity N, for 
conjunction of beliefs is N(A∩ B)=min{N(A), N(B)}, and for disjunction 
of disbeliefs is N(notA∪ notB)=max{N(notA), N(notB)}. But to make the 
beliefs and disbeliefs fully comparable is more complicated. See Rott, 
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Normally, if and only if the belief in each element meets the 
standard of proof, then the belief in the conjoined elements will too. 
That is, Bel(liable) would meet the standard of proof as compared to 
Bel(notliable)—but not necessarily. A fairly strong but insufficient dis-
belief on one element might be bigger than the sufficient belief on 
another element 109  This complication results from belief functions’ 
taking into account the uncertainty produced by imperfect evidence. 
Nevertheless, the law would not want to, and does not, charge its 
factfinders to perform this difficult mental task of comparing conjunc-
tion and disjunction. Even with the rough and ready formula, it is 
challenging to gauge the overall disbelief, which is a belief in a disjunc-
tion. We can ask the factfinder about its disbelief of a single fact, but 
disjunctive disbelief in a series of facts is difficult even to verbalize. 
Moreover, the comparison on the basis of the whole case might involve 
comparing a belief in one element to the disbelief of a different element, 
which is apt to stymie any factfinder. The law’s element-by-element 
method is more comprehensible (and corralling) than any holistic meth-
od, and it works out to be largely equivalent to the proper but difficult 
holistic method. 
The wisdom of the law in proceeding element-by-element appears 
even more obviously when one considers the other consequences. First, 
because applying the standard of proof element-by-element comfort-
ingly works out to be largely equivalent to applying the standard to the 
whole story properly conjoined, we do not have to worry much about 
renegade factfinders who construct an overall story. If the factfinder in 
actual practice approaches the case holistically, that practice would not 
directly endanger the standard of proof. Second, given that equivalence, 
general and special verdicts will work the same way. A nonequivalent 
holistic standard will run aground upon encountering a nongeneral ver-
dict (or a systematic judge in a bench trial). Third, the equivalence 
causes the apparent criticality of the number and scope of elements to  
supra note 50, at 310 (describing the “tension between degrees for beliefs 
and degrees for disbeliefs”). 
109. For example, if Bel(A)=.50 and Bel(notA)=.40, and if Bel(B)=.30 and 
Bel(notB)=.20, then Bel(A AND B)=.30 and Bel(notA OR notB))=.40. 
Thus, the element-by-element approach would produce a result different 
from the holistic approach. But this situation would not be common. 
Under a set of coherent beliefs and disbeliefs, if B is less likely than A, 
then notA should normally be less likely than notB. Cf. Rott, supra note 
50, at 311 (setting this relationship as an axiom). 
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melt away. “Element” would therefore best be seen as a synonym for a 
finding necessary to a cause of action or defense under the substantive 
law, one that the factfinder (or factfinders) must find to meet the stan-
dard of proof. In sum, the law is wise to tell its factfinders to proceed 
element-by-element. 
At the least, it is clear that the product rule does not apply to 
conjoining beliefs. The comparison of stories, as relative plausibility 
calls for, is not so clearly inappropriate. But if one views the stories 
through the lens of belief functions, the factfinder ought to believe the 
plaintiff’s story as much as the minimum belief among the elements, 
and the defendant’s best story as much as the minimum belief among 
that story’s elements. That is, the factfinder ought to gauge the convin-
cingness of any story by its weakest link. The defendant’s best story 
might have a weak link comparable to the plaintiff’s weakest link, even 
though disbelief in some other element is stronger than the plaintiff’s 
corresponding link. Thus, comparing plaintiff’s story to the defendant’s 
best story while focusing on their weakest links seriously stacks the deck 
against the defendant, effectively denying the benefits of disjunction to 
the defendant. This analysis explains why belief function theory says 
that we should instead look to the maximum disbelief among in the 
defendant’s links, and also why the law says to proceed element-by-
element. 
All these insights about conjunction establish the single biggest 
advantage of belief functions over relative plausibility. Belief functions 
prove that the conjunction paradox does not exist. Relative plausibility 
theorists, having built their theory on the faulty assumption of biva-
lence, are terribly troubled by conjunction. In fact, they created their 
whole theory to sidestep that paradox.110 If there is no conjunction para-
dox, we need not invent a biased holistic standard and so overturn 
established law in order to suppress the paradox. 
The superiority of belief functions, thanks to their mathematical 
sophistication, also resolves the aforementioned five big problems of 
relative plausibility.111 First, belief functions allow formulation of stand-
ards other than preponderance of the evidence. Second, they track well 
the instructions currently given to factfinders by the law. Third, they 
conform to the law by not requiring the nonburdened party to forward 
a competing story. Fourth, they come closest to minimizing expected 
 
110. See, e.g., Allen & Jehl, supra note 12, at 896 (describing two scholars’ 
attempts to “explain away the proof paradoxes”). Indeed, the motivating 
force of much of the latest theorizing about proof is the modern concern 
with the conjunction paradox, theorizing that tends to collapse along  
with that paradox. See, e.g., Jason Iuliano, Essay, Jury Voting Paradoxes,  
113 Mich. L. Rev. 405 (2014) (arguing for a method of avoiding the 
conjunction paradox in the jury decision-making process).  
111. See supra text accompanying notes 19–29 (listing five major problems 
with relative plausibility). 
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error costs. Fifth, they can accommodate any psychological theory on 
the evidence-processing that precedes applying the standard of proof. 
Conclusion 
This Article deployed belief functions to conceptualize the 
standards of proof. It was not a heavily prescriptive endeavor, which 
would have tried to argue normatively for the best way to apply stand-
ards. Instead, it was mainly a descriptive and explanatory endeavor, 
trying to unearth how standards of proof actually work in the law 
world. Compared to the traditionally probabilistic account and the 
newer conjecture of relative plausibility, this conceptualization con-
forms more closely to what we know of people’s cognition, captures 
better what the law says its standards are and how it manipulates them, 
and improves our mental image of the factfinders’ task. 
One virtue of the conceptualization is that it is not radically new, 
as it confirms the law’s ancient message that factfinders should simply 
compare their nonquantified views of the fact’s truth and falsity. It 
leaves the law’s standards essentially intact to accomplish their current 
purposes. Another virtue is that the conceptualization nevertheless 
manages to resolve some stubborn problems of proof: the theory implies 
that the factfinders should start the case, being in a state of ignorance 
with lack of proof, at a zero belief; and it also implies that the fact-
finders at the end of a case should apply the standard only to each 
separate element. Thus, for understanding the standards of proof, deg-
rees of belief work well. 
